After the strikes carried out in Iran by the United Stated and Israel on February 28, war and chaos have spread across the Middle East, affecting the Gulf and Lebanon and marking a new phase of instability and economic crisis. Meanwhile, Ukraine is still waiting for the Russian invasion to end, after four years of conflict.
To understand the new international scenario, ytali spoke with Michael Bociurkiw, a global affairs analyst, writer, founder of “World Briefing Report” on Substack, a frequent commentator on BBC World Television, BBC World Service Radio, Bloomberg TV, CTV, CBC and Al Jazeera, a Senior Fellow at the Washington DC-based Atlantic Council, attached to its Eurasia Center, the author of “Digital Pandemic”, published in 2021, and a former spokesperson at the Organization for Security & Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
Let’s focus on the strategic endgame: where do Israel and United States’ goals overlap and where do they diverge?
Definitely, the Trump administration and the government of Benjamin Netanyahu are working very much in lockstep.
I think the Americans are positioning the start of this war as something initiated by Israel, and as a key ally of the United States the administration is backing them. In a way, that may be politically strategic for the Trump administration because if this war doesn’t go well – and at the moment it certainly doesn’t look like it is – they may ultimately shift the blame onto their closest ally.
From the American point of view, what we are seeing now, with Trump moving ahead unilaterally and not going to Congress first for authorization for these strikes, is essentially a continuation of a pattern set by previous presidents. He is not the first president to bypass Congress in this way. But given that there was no apparent immediate national security threat to the US homeland, he should have consulted Congress – there is really no question about that.
That is aside from the serious questions raised by European leaders about whether international law was followed. It does not appear that it was. The UN Security Council was effectively circumvented.
What we are seeing is the widest interpretation of presidential military powers in a generation. It sidelines Congress. It sidelines the courts. It sidelines the rules-based international order and projects to the world – including to China – the idea that might is right and that brute force ultimately prevails.
There is also growing concern, as there should be, about rising civilian casualties on the ground, both in Iran and as a result of Israeli actions in Lebanon. That is deeply disturbing, particularly the apparent US Tomahawk missile strike on a school in Iran that killed 175 people, most of them children (contrary to what Mr. Trump said, the U.S. military is the only force involved in the conflict that uses Tomahawk missiles, The New York Times reported).
Another point is the fact that the Trump administration, including Mr. Trump himself, his cabinet secretaries, and the White House spokesperson, has significantly downplayed credible reports that Russia is providing targeting information to the Iranians so they can strike US assets in the Gulf – from embassies to military installations – degrading radar and early warning systems. That is really quite shocking.
Yes, Russia and Iran have a military cooperation pact. But given the extent to which Mr. Trump has gone to exhume Vladimir Putin from the diplomatic grave and place him back onto the world stage, red carpet and all – this is extraordinary. It does not appear that the United States will berate or sanction Russia for this. But we should be clear about what is happening: Russia, under Vladimir Putin, is assisting the Iranian clerical leadership in striking US assets in the Gulf, from embassies to military installations. It is really beyond belief.
In the United States, as elsewhere in the world, a debate is underway over the legitimacy of this attack, which was launched without prior authorization from the Congress. Speaking to the Italian newspaper La Repubblica, former Pentagon chief Leon Panetta said that the mission “has not been properly explained to the American people. At first, the president said the goal was regime change; then the Secretary of Defense contradicted him, saying that the objective was to target the missiles and the nuclear program. Later, the Secretary of State said that the intervention was triggered because Israel was about to strike. Others claimed there had been a threat of a pre-emptive action by Iran, but the Pentagon denied that. The American people – and the world – have the right to know what we are trying to achieve”. Although Congress recently rejected a resolution aimed at limiting Trump’s war powers in relation to Iran, public support still appears to be weak. How is Trump’s foreign policy doctrine evolving? And to what extent is he willing to sideline democratic checks and balances in order to pursue his political agenda?
On the legitimacy of this attack, there doesn’t seem to be any clear explanation being offered to the American people. Having just returned from the United States, I sensed a great deal of anxiety and confusion. Contradictory explanations are being given depending on who you speak to. And the American people absolutely have the right to know what is being done in their name, especially given the enormous cost of at least a billion dollars a day.
This is happening at a time when there are massive cuts in the United States to healthcare and to institutions like Voice of America, which has long been an instrument of American soft power projection.
Another important factor is that American stocks of weaponry are being rapidly depleted. The arsenals of American allies in the Gulf – from the UAE to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait – are also being drawn down. Their ability to intercept Iranian missiles and drones does not appear sustainable at this level of intensity for more than a few more days.
This raises serious questions about America’s ability to continue arming Ukraine in its fight to push back Russia.
At the same time, China has remained relatively quiet on the sidelines. But Beijing is certainly recalculating America’s ability to defend Taiwan. I would not be surprised if serious discussions are already taking place in Beijing about recalibrating the timing of a potential move on Taiwan. After all, in recent years Xi Jinping’s focus has been on rapidly building up China’s military – especially its navy and coast guard. The results have been nothing short of spectacular.
I doubt many of these broader strategic factors had been fully taken into account in the run-up to the decision to strike Iran.
Then we have to consider Europe, including countries like Italy, where there are legitimate anxieties about what this conflict could trigger, whether in terms of terrorist attacks in Europe or rising energy costs caused by oil price spikes and gas shortages. That could have severe economic consequences globally.
There are also fears in Europe about the risk of another migration wave if the situation deteriorates further (Turkey, a NATO member, is already seeing about 1000 Iranians crossing there border every day).
None of this has been properly explained. In fact, Mr. Trump often shifts tone from one day to the next, praising allies one moment and criticizing them the next.
If there is any glimmer of light in all of this, it may be that Europeans – shaken by these developments – are beginning to realize that the United States under Trump may no longer be a fully reliable partner. Many of them were not even given advance notice of the strikes, including Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, who is considered politically close to Mr. Trump.
As a result, European leaders are now – quite wisely, I think – beginning to distance themselves from the Trump administration and recalibrate what the future might look like, including whether they may ultimately need to move forward without the United States.
Turning to Russia’s role. Over the past year and a half Russia has seen three of its key regional allies fall: Bashar al-Assad in Syria, then Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela, and now Ali Khamenei in Iran. Although the Russia-Iran Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty signed in 2025 doesn’t include a mutual defense clause, recent reports from Washington Post suggest that Moscow is still providing Iran with intelligence to target US military forces in the Middle East.
With Tehran potentially entering a new phase and Moscow having relocated most of its drone production in Russia – using the same drones deployed throughout the war in Ukraine, how strategically important is Iran still for the Kremlin?
On Russia’s role, I’ve touched on it a little already, but Moscow is increasingly being seen as a very unreliable partner.
After all, it has let down key allies in Syria, in Venezuela, and now in Iran. Yes, Russia does appear to be providing targeting information or other forms of support. And let’s not forget that during the war in Ukraine we still don’t entirely know what Russia gave Iran in return for the thousands of drones Tehran supplied – although we do know there has been nuclear cooperation between the two countries.
What we are seeing, more broadly, is that these so-called strategic partnerships or defense arrangements with Moscow don’t necessarily count for very much. The Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty signed in 2025 between Russia and Iran, for example, notably does not include a mutual defense clause, meaning Russia has no legal obligation to defend Iran if it comes under attack.
And yes, it was a very strategic move by Moscow to relocate a large part of its drone production to Russia itself, using Iranian know-how and Iranian technical assistance. That has allowed Russia to essentially internalize that capability. We now also know that there is Chinese assistance involved as well.
So, what we are seeing is an interesting evolution. Iran remains important for Russia, particularly as a partner in sanctions evasion, military technology, and regional influence. But at the same time, Moscow has clearly structured the relationship in a way that avoids binding commitments – allowing the Kremlin to benefit from the partnership without being forced to come to Iran’s defense if the situation escalates.
It’s a very transactional relationship.
As you noted in your recent analyses, “Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has said he received a request from the United States ‘for specific support’ in dealing with Iran’s Shahed attack drones, as the US and its allies in the Middle East seek Ukraine’s expertise in countering such attacks”. In your view, could this give Ukraine added leverage in any future negotiations with Russia, considering the poor results achieved so far by the United States? And will the Gulf States take on a more substantial role in shaping a clearer roadmap towards the end of the war?
It’s quite astounding that, at this moment, President Zelenskyy appears to have been handed a fresh deck of cards. He has a much stronger hand than he did during that rather humiliating showdown in the White House a couple of years ago. It is also a positive development that Ukraine is now being viewed as a leader in counter-drone tactics and technologies.
Ukraine has had four years to learn how to bring down these drones and missiles. It is producing decoy drones and a whole range of other technologies that are giving Russia a very difficult time on the battlefield. And the irony here is quite striking: after publicly dressing down Mr. Zelenskyy and, on at least two occasions, withholding weapons or intelligence, the United States is now turning to Ukraine for assistance in countering Iranian drones in the Gulf – both to protect its own installations and to help Gulf countries defend themselves (eleven countries have requested Ukraine’s help in countering Shahed-type drones, Zelenskyy said Monday).
There is another important point here. For quite some time, Gulf states have largely turned a blind eye to Iran’s activities in supplying drones and other materials to Russia for its war in Ukraine. This was not something that could easily be hidden. At the same time, countries like the United Arab Emirates have rolled out the red carpet for Russian tourists and oligarchs, allowing them to park their yachts in the Gulf and invest heavily in luxury property. Russians have become some of the biggest buyers of high-end real estate in places like Dubai.
Now, in a sense, this is coming home to roost. One would hope that Gulf states now recognize that Russia is not a particularly reliable partner or responsible actor. They could make it more difficult for Russians to settle in the Gulf, to invest there, and perhaps even consider temporary limits – if not a complete halt – on Russian tourism until Moscow demonstrates that it is prepared to behave more responsibly and end its illegal war in Ukraine.
What a forceful message that would be for Mr. Putin. Whether that will actually happen is another question.
Ironic, is it not, that pretty much the same Iranian drones which have terrorized Ukrainian civilians for the past four years are now threatening the countless Russians visiting or living in the Gulf.
Mr. Zelenskyy is also in a very sensitive position. Ukrainians remember very well what happened under the Budapest Memorandum, when Ukraine gave up its vast nuclear arsenal in exchange for security assurances from Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States – assurances that proved essentially worthless, especially after 2014. So, he will have to be extremely careful about what he offers and how he responds to this request.
If Ukraine does provide expertise or technology, it should come with very clear conditions. Kyiv should say: yes, we will help, but we need concrete guarantees in return. The key issue, of course, is security guarantees. There must be an end to pressure on Ukraine to surrender territory that Russia does not even fully control, including unresolved questions such as the future of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, the extraction of rare earth minerals and so on.
This moment could potentially shift the balance somewhat in Ukraine’s favor. But whether it will fundamentally change the dynamics of the war I cannot say with complete certainty.
The Strait of Hormuz serves as one of the most crucial chokepoints in the world, accounting for approximately 20% of the global oil and gas flow, according to the BBC. What could the short- and medium-term consequences be for regional powers and beyond?
What’s happening in the Strait of Hormuz – aside from potentially cutting off about one-fifth of the world’s oil supply – will obviously also hurt Iran itself, because Tehran still needs to export oil to major clients such as China.
China is also confronted with the real present challenge of keeping energy flows. However, China – the world’s largest buyer of oil – was massively stockpiling oil in the first two months of this year. Iran was the source of 13 percent of its oil imports.
But beyond the threat to global energy flows, there is another important dimension. Iran is not only targeting energy infrastructure – which, incidentally, looks very similar to the way Russia has targeted Ukraine’s energy grid – it is also acting quite strategically. For example, Iran has been striking desalination plants, which Gulf states rely on heavily for their water supply. In desert countries, that is comparable to targeting electricity, water, or heating systems in Ukraine.
This raises the question of whether Russia may also be advising Iran on how to select targets in order to inflict maximum disruption. Hitting desalination facilities in countries that depend almost entirely on them for fresh water is a very serious escalation, and I think this aspect of the conflict has perhaps been underplayed.
So, on the one hand we have the potential disruption of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, which is already pushing oil prices upward. On the other hand, Iran is also going after critical infrastructure in Gulf countries. The question is how long those states will be able to tolerate that pressure (at the start of this week, Qatar lashed out at the instigators of the current conflict: Foreign Ministry spokesperson Majed Al-Ansari said it has caused “catastrophic results”, adding that no single place in the Gulf region has been spared. “This is the biggest ‘I told you so’ in the history of ‘I told you so’s’ in the world. We have said from Day One that left unchecked, the escalation that started in 2023 would lead to a regional war.”).
We should also point out that the image many Gulf countries have meticulously cultivated – for example the UAE as a safe haven and global playground – has taken a serious hit. The longer this conflict drags on, the harder it will be for them to preserve and restore that image.
As the fighting spreads across the Middle East, who is really gaining from this conflict? And how does China fit into this picture?
I’ll tackle your last question first: who really benefits from this conflict? I’m not entirely sure. Certainly Israel benefits, because it has long sought to neutralize the clerical leadership in Iran as well as Iranian-backed proxies region-wide. This is undoubtedly being seen in Israel as a golden moment to widen the scope of the conflict, including going after Hezbollah in Lebanon.
But beyond targeting Hezbollah, it is deeply worrying how indiscriminate Israeli strikes there appear to be. It seems as though Benjamin Netanyahu feels largely unconstrained with the backing of President Trump. And let us not forget that the ongoing escalation is shifting attention away from Bibi’s own political and legal problems at home.
The American military-industrial complex is certainly benefiting as well, because Trump has essentially told the defense industry to ramp up production significantly – and they have agreed to do so – but this will not happen overnight. Still, that means enormous revenues and new job opportunities. However, I don’t think this will benefit Mr. Trump politically, especially with the November midterms approaching.
We are already seeing dissent within parts of his MAGA base – figures such as Megyn Kelly, for example – expressing anything from displeasure to outright bewilderment about why this war is happening. Having recently returned from the United States, I did not hear a single word of support for this war. Whether in New York, New Jersey, Washington, D.C., or Maryland, I didn’t see banners supporting it – not one.
In fact, the real political risk for Mr. Trump may come when prices start to rise. It doesn’t take long for an increase in crude oil prices to translate into higher prices at the pump – and I believe that is already beginning to happen. Higher oil prices will also mean more expensive air travel and rising costs for many consumer goods, including groceries.
In that sense, this was a huge roll of the dice for Mr. Trump – a very big gamble – and I’m not convinced it will yield many political dividends.
Some people speculate that the timing may have been intended to distract attention from issues such as the Epstein files. There is no proof of that. But what is clear is that the strategy does not appear to have been fully thought through (several nuclear experts who spoke to MS NOW questioned the extent to which U.S. negotiator Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner – who led the nuclear negotiations and described the Iranian position to Trump – understood the technical details of the enrichment programs at the heart of the deliberations).
I think his MAGA base, and certainly Republicans on Capitol Hill, are becoming increasingly nervous because there is no clear end in sight. The conflict appears to be widening and, in many ways, beginning to spiral out of control.
As for China, I think this conflict gives Beijing a very clear view of the Trump administration’s governing style and of how far the United States may be willing to go in pursuit of regime change. China has already warned against attempts to impose regime change in Iran and has called for de-escalation.
At the same time, the war may work to China’s advantage in certain ways. Beijing could use this moment to position itself as a more responsible global power – supporting international institutions and diplomatic initiatives in areas where the United States has stepped back.
But there is another strategic dimension. The longer the United States is distracted by this conflict – and the more its military stockpiles are depleted – the more Chinese planners may be reassessing the timing of any potential move on Taiwan. U.S. weapons stocks are already being drawn down rapidly by the war with Iran, raising concerns about Washington’s ability to sustain multiple conflicts simultaneously.
That does not mean an invasion of Taiwan is imminent. It would be extraordinarily complex and risky. But with the United States heavily engaged in another major conflict, Beijing may well be tempted to reconsider its timetable.
L’articolo War in Iran: Interview with Michael Bociurkiw proviene da ytali..
4uMagazine
